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This paper develops and tests a simple model of the simultaneous determination of 
gross fixed capital formation by multinational Japanese firms in home and host 
countries. We treat multinational firms as multi-product firms, choosing optimal 
investment locations and production scale for each product. We test the predictions of 
the model on a unique dataset covering 1707 fixed capital investment decisions by 
(affiliates of) Japanese multinational firms in the manufacturing sector based on 
research conducted in 1996 and 1997. We find that the rate of investment is not only 
determined by factors affecting the return on investment levels in a country (e.g. 
effective demand and wages), but also by wage levels in other countries in which the 
firm operates manufacturing affiliates. Firms facing global liquidity constraints show 
systematically lower investment ratios, suggesting that financing constraints are another 
source of interaction between investments.  
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    Investment decisions are the quintessential decisions over which the multinational 
firm will seek central control and the multinational firm is expected to coordinate and decide 
centrally on worldwide investment allocation. Although there is an expanding literature on 
the role of multinational firms on global trade and international investment flows, very few 
studies have analyzed multinational firms' fixed capital investment decisions (Desai et al. 
2005a).
2  
  There are two main channels for interaction between investments in different countries by 
the multinational firm (e.g. Stevens and Lipsey 1992). First, on the manufacturing side, 
locations in different countries may be competing for investment projects as the multinational 
firm is likely to compare the expected profitability of performing the project in alternative 
locations. On the other hand, investment decisions may also be complementary through their 
(local) demand enhancing effects and expansion of vertical intra-firm trade. Second, on the 
financing side, different investment projects may also be in competition if the firm faces 
financing constraints resulting in an upward sloping capital cost function: projects in one 
country may reduce investments in marginal projects in other countries. A counteracting 
force may be that multinational firms have more options to utilize internal or external local 
                                                            
2 The behaviour of multinational firms and the consequences of multinational firm activity for the 
local economies of host and home countries have received considerable attention in economic 
research. Attention has focused on the firm and host country determinants of foreign direct 
investment (e.g. Wheeler and Mody 1992, Belderbos and Sleuwaegen 1996, Chen and Moore 2009, 
Yeaple 2009, Aw and Lee 2008, Blonigen et al. 2005) the effects of FDI on trade (e.g. Blomström et 
al. 1997, Lipsey and Wise 1984 Belderbos and Sleuwaegen 1998, Head and Ries 2001, Hanson et al. 
2005), the consequences of multinational activity for domestic wages and employment (e.g. Budd et 
al. 2005, Slaughter 2000, Feenstra and Hanson 1996, Brainard and Riker 1997, Head and Ries 2002, 
Ito and Fukao, 2005; Konings and Murphy 2006), and (technology) spillovers from foreign direct 
investments (e.g. Haskell et al. 2007, Aitken et al. 1997).  
   2
and international sources of finance, reducing their overall financial constraints (Desai et al. 
2004; Harrison et al. 2003).    
  This paper is the first to examine such potential interactions between global 
investment projects by multinational firms at the micro level. Since coordinated global fixed 
capital investments decisions are a potential channel for the international transmission of 
financial and real shocks across economies, it is of interest to empirically investigate the 
magnitude and nature of interactions in fixed capital investments. Studies to date have 
however analyzed relationships at the aggregate industry or macro level, have substituted 
balance of payments data on the financing of FDI for actual capital expenditure data, or have 
narrowed attention to the relationship between foreign direct investment and the domestic 
capital stock.
3  Only two studies have examined interaction between fixed capital investments 
at the firm level. Stevens and Lipsey (1992) used panel data on a sample of 7 US 
multinational firms and focused analysis on the impact of finance constraints. They confirmed 
a negative interaction effect between foreign and domestic investments stemming from a rise 
in marginal capital cost. Desai et al. (2005a) examined the impact of various measures of 
foreign activities on domestic (US) activities by multinational firms in a panel of US 
multinational firms. Instrumenting aggregate foreign activity of the firms by differences in 
host country economic growth, they find a positive relation between FDI and domestic capital 
expenditures.  
                                                            
3 Findings in Belderbos (1992) suggest substitution between FDI stocks and domestic assets for Dutch 
multinational firms, but the study relied on aggregated industry level balance sheet data. Feldstein 
(1995) and Desai et al (2005b) similarly find a negative impact of FDI on the aggregate capital stock 
across OECD countries although Desai et al. (2005a) obtain a complementary relationship if the 
analysis is restricted to domestic capital of multinational firms. Herzer and Schroten (2006), in 
contrast, find a positive relationship between outward FDI flows from the US and domestic aggregate 
capital formation, but a negative relationship for Germany.   3
  In this paper we attempt to uncover the interactions between investments by multinational 
firms in different locations through a systematic study of simultaneous fixed capital 
investment decisions. We broaden the focus of analysis by examining investment decisions 
in all locations in which the multinational firms are active and we infer interactions between 
investments in all these locations (including the home country) from their determinants. We 
examine global fixed capital investment decisions by Japanese multinational firms, drawing 
on unpublished affiliate level fixed capital investment data contained in the Survey of Trends 
in Business Activities of Foreign Affiliates conducted by the Ministry of Economy, Trade 
and Industry (METI).  Our analysis is informed by a model of the simultaneous gross fixed 
capital formation decision by multinational firms. Starting point is the notion of optimal 
dynamic investment behaviour under nonconvex adjustment costs, following Abel and 
Eberly (1994), Eberly (1997) and Barnett and Sakellaris (1998). We treat multinational firms 
as multi-product firms choosing optimal locations for each unique product based on effective 
(host country and export) demand, productivity, and wage costs at the industry level. Our 
model emphasizes interactions through the manufacturing side and allows for demand as well 
as cost considerations in FDI decisions, while controlling for financial constraints. 
Examining 1707 fixed capital investment decisions in 1996, we find qualified support for the 
predictions of the model. The rate of investment is not only determined by factors affecting 
the return on investment in a country and industry but also by the wage of other countries in 
which the firm operates manufacturing affiliates.   
   4
 
2. A Model of Global Fixed Capital Investments by Multinational Firms 
 
We develop a model of fixed capital investments to determine how a multinational firm 
allocates investment over a number of manufacturing locations in C different countries 
(including the home country). We study the firm’s optimal dynamic investment behaviour 
under non-convex adjustment costs following the investment models developed by Abel and 
Eberly (1994), Eberly (1997) and Barnett and Sakellaris (1998). Let Et denote the 
expectations operator conditional on information available at time t. The current gross profit 
at time t is given by   Z K K K Ct t t , ,..., , 2 1   where Kct is the beginning of period stock of 
capital in country c and Z  denotes the number of products made by the firm. A linear 












 where Ict is 
gross investment in country c at year t and 

ct p  is the unit cost of capital at time t in country c. 
The parameter α measures the size of the quadratic adjustment costs. We allow for zero 
investment decisions by assuming a non-convexity in the adjustment cost function allowing 
for irreversibility of investment. To that end, the dummy variable dct takes the value one if 
investment is positive, otherwise it equals zero.
4 The value of the firm, accounting for its 
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4 This implies that the returns of selling capital on the second hand market equal zero.   5
 
where  ρ is the discount factor. The firm maximizes equation (1) subject to the capital 
accumulation equations given by:   ct ct ct I K K      1 1  for  c=1,..,C.  The first order 
condition for investment Ict yields 
 










where the shadow price of installed capital is given by the expression   




























   . Following Abel and Eberly (1994), 
Eberly (1997) and Barnett and Sakellaris (1998), we can determine the optimal investment 
rule as: 
 
(3)   





     if RHS>0; 





    otherwise. 
 
The presence of an investment rate equal to zero in our model stems from the irreversible 
nature of investment.
5  When investment is assumed to be irreversible, abstaining from 
adjusting the capital stock is preferred to scrapping, as scrapping yields no proceeds while a 
zero investment rate provides the option to use the capital assets when economic conditions 
improve in the future. 
                                                            
5 An alternative way to model non-convexity that allows explaining zero investment observations is 
to assume fixed capital adjustment costs that are independent of the investment size (Abel and Eberly, 
1994).     6























is small relative to the marginal profit of capital and therefore 










  , ,.., . 1 follows an autoregressive process of order 2 (AR(2)), substituting 
an AR(2) process into the expression for the marginal profit of capital leads to the following 
investment equation (c.f. Abel and Blanchard, 1986, pp. 253-254):
 6 
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1   and 
*
2   are a function of the parameters governing the AR(2) process 
just mentioned. Investment is determined by the marginal profit of capital in period t-1 and t-
2.
7 Alternatively, if we assume that the marginal profit of capital follows an AR(1) process, 
*
2   is zero and investment depends on  marginal profitability of capital in t-1 only. In the 
empirical analysis, we will examine both specifications. 
 
                                                            
6 This approach disregards the fact that due to non convex adjustment costs the marginal value of 
capital depends on the notion that additional capital at date t  affects the future probability of 
investment (cf. Bontempi et al., 2004). The approach taken here is not likely to lead to omitted 
variables since variables that affect the current decision to invest also influence the future probability 
to adjust capital (cf. Nilsen and Schiantarelli, 2003; Letterie and Pfann, 2007).  




1      are positive (Nilsen and Schiantarelli, 2003; and 
Letterie and Pfann, 2007).    7
The marginal profit of capital 
We turn to the firm’s profit maximization behaviour in the short run to determine the 
fundamentals of the marginal profit of capital. For notational convenience we drop time 
subscripts. The firm produces Z differentiated products. The firm needs specific knowledge 
in order to produce each product, and the number of products depends on the firm’s past 
R&D activities. The term zc denotes the number of products produced by the firm in country 
c. The total number of products is given by 
 







where C denotes the total number of countries. We assume that firms produce one type of 
product in one single location depending on effective demand, wage costs, and productivity. 
The time path of Z is exogenously determined and we treat the number of products Z and the 
capital stocks located around the world, (K1, K2, …., KC) as given. The firm manufactures a 
product in country c using Lc units of labour. Total factor productivity in the country for the 
manufacture of the product is denoted by Ωc. Total production in country c by the firm is 
equal to  c cQ z  where  Qc is the volume of production of a single product. Let the firm’s 
production function for each product in country c take the form of a Cobb-Douglas function 
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with 0<β<1. Capital stock and labour input are equally distributed across the number of 
variants of the product  c z .  
  We consider multiproduct firms under  monopolistic competition. Following Helpman et 
al. (2004), Yeaple (2009) and Chen and Moore (2010) we assume that preferences across 
product varieties have the standard CES form, such that demand of country c’ for the firm’s 
output produced in country c can be expressed by: 
 




























where 0<σ<1 is the elasticity of substitution between products. Ec’ denotes nominal 
expenditure on all products in country c’,  ' ,c c p is the market price of a product manufactured 
in country c exported to country c’ and  ' c P  is the price index of all products sold in country c
’. 
Following Yeaple (2009) and Chen and Moore (2010) we do not close the model through 
entry. We furthermore consider the model in partial equilibrium and take the price index  ' c P  
faced by the firm as exogenous.
8 
  The firm can export from country c to all other countries but faces an iceberg type trade 
cost: if the firm exports its products from country c to country c’, only 100/(1+μc, c’) percent 
of exported products arrives at the destination, with μc, c=0 and μc, c’>0 for all c≠c’. Therefore, 
the firm faces the following constraint on output of each product:  
 
(8)     c
C
c
c c c c Q D   
1 '
' , ' , 1   
                                                            
8 We also assume that the firm produces goods that are sufficiently differentiated in order to abstract 
from substitution within the firm's portfolio or products.    9
 
The firm maximizes its current gross profit in the short run under a given set of capital stocks 
located in each country, {Kc: c=1, 2, .., C}, the variety of products, Z, and the wage cost per 
unit of labour in country c, wc.  
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w VC   denotes the variable cost of labour of a single product. 
The firm makes a number of choices in the following order. It first determines the number of 
products it produces in each country {zc: c=1, 2, .., C}, with the total number of products, Z, 
given. Next, it selects the optimal prices for its products {pc, c’: c=1, 2, .., C and c’=1, 2, .., 
C }, the optimal level of production {Qc: c=1, 2, .., C} and demand for labour {Lc: c=1, 2, .., 
C} simultaneously. In the appendix we show that the optimal number of products to be 
manufactured in country c,  zc , is given by: 
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c c c s
'
' ' denotes the attractiveness of the other countries, weighted by their share 
of the existing capital stock.  c   increases if total factor productivity in country c, ( c  )   10
increases, if the unit wage cost wc decreases, and if attractiveness of the country in terms of 










































   
and captures a positive effect of real expenditures on the product in the country ( ' c E ), and a 
positive effect of the opportunity to export at lower cost ( ' ,c c  ).  Equation (10) indicates that 
it is not only a country's own attractiveness that determines product allocation decisions, but 
also the relative attractiveness of other countries in which the multinational firms is 
established, in particular those countries in which there are large existing investments in 
capital. The same pattern can be observed in the expression for the marginal product of 
capital in country c (derived in the appendix): 
 







































The firm’s marginal product of capital in country c depends on the expression for the three 
factors. First, it is affected by the country’s own attractiveness given by  c  . It is 
straightforward to derive that the marginal product of capital increases in  c  . Second, the 
marginal productivity of capital decreases as other countries’ attractiveness (the index  c  ) 
increases.
9 Third, marginal productivity improves if the firm’s number of product varieties 








 increases.  Substituting (11) in (4) we see that fixed 
                                                            
9 As σβθ<1. We refer to the appendix, where   is defined.   11
capital investments in country c depend on these three factors, as the investment path is 
determined by the marginal product of capital in t-1 and t-2. 
 
 
3. Empirical Model, Data and Variables 
 
If we substitute equation (11) in equation (4) and take a loglinear approximation, we obtain 
an empirical version of the investment equation. In case  0
*
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    if RHS>0 
                            





         o t h e r w i s e  
 
where the upper bar expressions in the above equation denote that the corresponding 
variables are calculated as the weighted average of the variable for the other countries. If 
0
*
2   then the differenced values of the variables in equation (12) have to be included as 
well. Estimation of equation (12) implies the use of a tobit model, allowing for censoring of 
investment ratios at zero. 
 
Data 
Our analysis draws on unpublished data on fixed capital investments of Japanese firms from 
the sixth Basic Survey of Overseas Business Activities held in 1996 (data for fiscal year   12
1995) and the 27
th Trend Survey of Overseas Business Activities held in 1997 (data for fiscal 
year 1996). The Basic Survey is an extensive survey among Japanese multinational firms 
conducted every three years and the Trend Survey is a shortened survey conducted in the two 
years between the Benchmark Surveys. Both surveys are conducted by the Japanese Ministry 
of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI, former MITI) and ask firms to supply information 
for the parent firm each of their foreign affiliates. The response rates of the surveys at the 
parent firm level are 60.4% and 59.1%, respectively, but because non-responding firms are 
usually small in size, the coverage in terms of global affiliates is substantially higher. 
Affiliate data on capital stocks are only included in the Basic Survey, but gross fixed capital 
investment data are included in all surveys. We merged the two datasets at the parent and 
affiliate level to analyze investments in fiscal year 1996 (the year ending March 1997) as a 
ratio of the capital stock at the end of fiscal year 1995 (March 1996). Data on capital stocks 
and gross fixed capital investments in Japan were drawn from the third and the fourth Basic 
Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities held in 1996 and 1997 by METI (data 
for fiscal 1995 and 1996). This survey is mandatory and has a response rate exceeding 90 
percent.  
  We calculate the relevant capital stocks and fixed capital investment of a multinational 
firm in all countries in which they operate manufacturing activities by main industry of the 
affiliate. If a firm operates more manufacturing affiliates in the same industry in a country, 
capital stock and fixed capital investments were aggregated at the country level. If affiliates 
operate in different industries, a capital stock and investment variable was derived for each 
industry in a host country.
10 We selected parent firms active in manufacturing industries and 
                                                            
10  This occurred infrequently (38 firms). For parent firm operations no such detail on capital 
expenditures by industry is available. We used the main line of business in Japan to allocate the 
domestic capital stock and capital investments to an industry, while the capital stock in Japan was used 
as weight  c s  for all foreign fixed capital investment decisions.   13
responding to two overseas business surveys and the domestic activity survey. Since quite a 
few firms tend to respond erratically to the foreign activity survey, this reduced our sample 
substantially. Second, for these firms we needed complete information for manufacturing 
affiliates worldwide. This required reliable item responses for all relevant variables (capital 
stocks and fixed capital investments) for all manufacturing affiliates. Finally, the sample was 
reduced due to the unavailability of some explanatory variables (mainly industry-level output 
and demand). All this left us with 1707 observations on investments in 29 countries 
(including Japan) by 502 Japanese firms active in 20 industries. On average each 
multinational firm has capital allocated to 3.5 countries.  
  The gross investment ratio is total gross fixed capital investment of the firm in a country 
in fiscal year 1996 divided by the value of the firm’s fixed tangible assets in the country at 
the end of fiscal year 1995. It is equal to zero for 5.3 percent of the observations.  
 
INSERT Tables 1 and 2 
 
  The industry- and regional- distribution of our observations is summarized in Tables 1 
and 2. The largest number of investment observations in the sample is in the Motor Vehicle 
industry (274) followed by Electrical Machinery, Radio TV and Communication Equipment, 
Chemicals, and Non-Electrical Machinery (Table 1). The highest capital stocks are present in 
capital intensive industries such as Petroleum Refinery and Iron & Steel. Average investment 
ratios range from 0.12 for the Food and Beverage industry to 0.67 for Other Transport 
Equipment. Table 2 shows that among foreign countries, affiliates in the United States (248), 
China, Taiwan and Thailand are best represented. On average the capital stock is much 
higher in Japan than abroad, showing that most multinational firms still have most of their   14
assets located in Japan. The ratio of investment to total fixed tangible assets is however 
smaller in Japan compared with the comparable ratio in most overseas affiliates. 
 
Explanatory Variables 
The wage rate (WAGEi) is measured by the industry wage rate and is calculated as salary 
paid divided by the total number of employees in a country and industry, using data on 
salaries and employees of the population of Japanese manufacturing affiliates in the 
industries and countries in 1995. The average wage rate in other countries in which the firm 
is active (WAGEj) is calculated similarly, with wage rates in other countries weighted with 
the firm’s fixed tangible assets in each country in 1995. Effective demand (DEMANDi) is 
taken as the sum of industry demand of the host country and demand in all other countries 
weighted by the distance between countries, with weights  r 5 . 0 / 1  (where r is distance).
11 
Demand in the host country is weighted by taking as parameter r the radius of the country 
using the country’s area size. Industry demand in the countries is calculated as production 
levels plus imports minus exports. The industry output and export and import data were 
collected from UNIDO (2003a), the OECD’s STAN database for industry analysis, and 
Statistics Canada’s World Trade Analyzer. For China data were taken from the China 
Statistical Yearbook and for Taiwan data were drawn from Input-Output Tables published by 
the Republic of China’s Statistics Bureau. Demand in other countries (DEMANDj) is 
calculated in the same manner, and then weighted by the firm’s fixed tangible assets in each 
country in 1995. 
  We proxy for industry and country level differences in total factor productivity by the 
ratio of the number of patents generated by inventors domiciled in the countries over industry 
level output (per 1 million US dollar) in the country (PRODVi). The industry-level patent 
                                                            
11 This follows Head and Mayer (2004) who term this potential demand. The weight assumes that 
demand is equally distributed in a circle of radius r.    15
intensity measure is an indicator of the technology intensity of production in the industry and 
country. While direct measures of total factor productivity estimates would obviously be 
preferred, TFP estimates do not exist for all the countries in the sample at the detailed 
industry level.  We assigned patents to industries based on the patent to industry concordance 
tables developed by Frauenhofer/OST (Smoch et al. 2003), adapted to third revision ISIC 
classifications. This concordance attaches to each international patent classification code 
(IPC, describing the technological domain of the patent) a probability that it is originating in 
a specific ISIC industry, based on the industries of applicant firms. The technology level in 
other countries (PRODVj) is calculated in the same manner and weighted by the firm’s fixed 
tangible assets in each country in 1995.  
  Since information on the number of product or product varieties is not available, we 









the R&D to capital stock ratio. The R&D variable (RDINTf) is R&D expenditures in 1995 
divided by total global assets in the world at the end of fiscal year 1995.  
  We lack a suitable proxy for the unit cost of capital goods  t c p ,  as it may differ across 
countries and industries, or firms. To the extent that multinational firms buy capital goods on 
global markets or use capital goods developed in Japan, we may not expect strong country 
variation in the cost of capital goods. Industry variation in the costs of capital goods is taken 
into account in the empirical model through the inclusion of industry dummies.
12 We 
augment the equation with a measure of liquidity constraints faced by the firm to control for 
potential interaction in investment decisions through the marginal cost of capital facing the 
                                                            
12 We experimented with inclusion of a variable measuring the share of capital goods procured from 
local sources, following the idea that local over international sourcing is most likely to occur if the 
cost of capital goods in the host country market is relatively low, but found no significant impact on 
investment.   16
firms (Stevens and Lipsey, 1992). We control for liquidity constraints by including the firm’s 
global coverage ratio in 1995 (COVERAGEf). The global coverage ratio is calculated as total 
interest payments divided by total interest payment plus cash flow for the firm’s global 
operations at the end of fiscal 1995.  
  All the variables are taken in natural logarithms.
13 We estimate equation (12) both under 
0
*
2    and  0
*
2   . In the latter case, the first differences (1994-1995) of the variables 
(DEMAND, WAGE, and PRODV) are included as well. We calculated the weighted 
differenced variables for other countries with the firm’s fixed tangible assets in each country 
in 1995 as weights. Table 3 contains the descriptive statistics for the variables; the correlation 
matrix is relegated to appendix 2.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 
 
5. Empirical Results 
  The Tobit estimation results of equation (12) are presented in Table 4. We allow for 
heteroscedasticity in the error term dependent on affiliate size (the logarithm of the affiliate’s 
total assets) and we allow standard errors to be correlated across observations of the same 
parent firm by clustering error terms at the firm level.  
 
INSERT TABLE 4  
 
  Model 1 in Table 4 contains the results for the model with  0
*
2    and Model 2 adds the 
differenced values of the country variables ( 0
*
2   ) in line with the assumption of an AR(2) 
                                                            
13 For variables that can also take the value zero (R&D, patents, and investment) we added the value 
one before taking logarithms.    17
process for the marginal rate of return on capital. In both models, the weighted R&D 
intensity of the multinational firms (RDINTf) is positive as predicted, and significant. The 
coverage ratio (COVERAGEf), as indicator of liquidity constraints faced by the firms in their 
global operations, has the expected negative sign and is also significant. The estimated 
parameter for heteroscedasticity shows that the variance of the error term is negatively 
related to affiliate size.   
  In model 1, the wage rate in the country and industry (WAGEi) has a significantly 
negative impact on the gross fixed capital investment ratio. At the same time, the weighted 
average wage rate in other countries in which the firm is active (WAGEj) has the predicted 
positive impact and is significant. These two findings imply that a country becomes an 
attractive location for the purpose of investing if its wages are low and if wages in other 
countries are high. The proxy variable for productivity (PRODV) has no significant impact. 
The industry demand variable for other countries (DEMANDj) is marginally significant but 
has a counterintuitive positive sign.   
  Results for model 2 are overall more in line with predictions. The model has a 
significantly improved fit, with the loglikelihood ratio test statistic at 14.8 against a critical 
value of the Chi-square distribution of 12.53 (at 5 percent significance). The results show that 
it is host country wage growth that has the most robust negative impact on fixed capital 
investments, rather than wage levels: wage growth is significantly negative, while the wage 
level looses its significance. We again find that the average wage rate in other countries in 
which the firm operates (WAGEj) is positive and significant. In addition, host country 
demand growth (ΔDEMANDi) has the expected positive impact on investment and is 
significant, while the level variables for DEMAND are insignificant. The productivity level 
(PRODVi) in the host country industry is positive and significant at the 10 percent level in 
column 2.    18
  Overall the results provide qualified support for the model of global fixed capital 
investments. Although levels of significance differ, investment ratios by the multinational 
firms in a country are determined by (growth in) local wage costs, local productivity and 
demand growth, and R&D intensity as a proxy for product scope. Interaction in investment 
decisions cross countries takes places as a function of differences in wage levels and wage 
growth, while such influences cannot be found for demand and productivity. This implies 
that investment rates are not only driven by host features of the local economy, but also 
depend on the multinational firm's existing configuration of affiliates and capital in other 
countries and the relative wage in these countries. Interaction furthermore occurs through 
financial constraints in the global operations of the multinational firm, which implies that 
liquidity constraints of operations in one country affect investments in another.  
  The marginal effects of the country level and firm drivers of the investment rate are not 
insubstantial. We calculated the change in the mean predicted investment rate in the sample 
due to a standard deviation change in explanatory variables, with other variables kept at their 
actual levels.
14 A standard deviation increase in the host country wage rate causes the mean 
predicted investment rate to decrease by 7.5 percent, while a standard deviation increase in 
wage j  increases the investment rate by 5.5 percent (model 1) . In model 2, a standard 
deviation increase in growth of host country wages decreases the investment rate by 4.5 
percent, while a standard deviation increase in the wage j increases investment with 7 percent. 
A standard deviation increase in demand growth in model 2 increases the investment rate by 
                                                            
14 See also Maddala (1983, p. 159) for the calculation of the expexted value in a tobit model. We see 
these changes in the mean prediction within the sample as slightly more conservative than estimates 
of marginal effects in the mean of the explanatory variables, as the latter are derived for a 
hypothetical firm. Marginal effects in the tobit model can be further decomposed in the effect on the 
probability of positive investment and the effect on the investment level (McDonald and Moffit, 
1980). Given the limited censoring of the investment variable (5 percent of observations is zero), the 
elasticities are by and large representative of the effect on investment levels.    19
10 percent, a standard deviation increase in productivity 8 percent, and the effects of R&D 
and the coverage ratio are 8 and minus 6 percent, respectively. 
 
Supplementary Analysis  
  The relatively weak results for effective demand and productivity effects may be partly 
caused by the restrictions of the data we are working with. Patent to output ratios are a very 
imperfect proxy for local productivity at the country and industry level. The weaker demand 
effects may be due to the assumption that effective demand is only weighted by trade cost 
related to distance, which abstracts from various degrees of trade barriers between countries. 
Also, in case affiliates in host countries manufacture product variants tailored to the host 
country, demand in other countries may not be consequential for investment decisions. We 
estimated alternative models including a local (host country) demand variable replacing the 
effective demand variable, but the empirical results did not show a strong pattern of local 
demand driving investment decisions. Similarly,we did not find stronger results by replacing 
industry output for revealed demand, or by applying a different weighing method to host 
country demand.  
  We also performed supplementary analysis of extended models including a measure of 
the effective tax rate in the countries of investment (e.g. Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Head and 
Mayer; 2004; Chen and Moore 2009), measured as the average ratio of Japanese firms' 
effective tax payments to profits as indicated by their reporting in the METI surveys. Neither 
the tax rate in country i nor the tax rate in other countries j in which the firms operate 
manufacturing affiliates exerted a significant influence on the investment rate.  




  We examine the determinants of, and interaction between, fixed capital investments 
decisions by multinational firms at the micro level. Our focus is on the simultaneous 
determination of investment decisions in all locations in which the multinational firms are 
active, and we infer interactions between investments in all these locations (including the 
home country) from their determinants. To guide our empirical analysis, we developed a 
simple model of the simultaneous gross fixed capital formation decision by multinational 
firms. Starting point is the notion of optimal dynamic investment behaviour under nonconvex 
adjustment costs, following Abel and Eberly (1994), Eberly (1994) and Barnett and 
Sakellaris (1998). We treat multinational firms as multi-product firms choosing optimal 
locations for each unique product based on effective (host country and potential export) 
demand, productivity, and wage costs at the industry level. Our model emphasizes 
interactions through the manufacturing side and allows for demand as well as cost 
considerations in FDI decisions, while controlling for financial constraints. We test the 
predictions of the model on a sample of 1707 fixed capital investment decisions by Japanese 
multinational firms in 1996. 
  We find qualified support for the predictions of the model where it concerns interactions 
through relative wages. The rate of investment is not only determined by factors affecting the 
return on investment in the country itself (i.e. effective demand, wages and productivity), but 
also (positively) by relative wage levels in other countries in which the firm operates 
manufacturing affiliates. R&D intensive firms, assumed to have broader product line-ups, 
show higher investment ratios over all locations. Global liquidity levels of the firm, as 
indicated by the coverage ratio, also increase investment rates. The results provide more   21
support for an investment specification that includes first differenced drivers of the marginal 
product of capital consistent with a time path following an AR(2) process, than for a 
specification in levels which would be consistent with an AR(1) process. 
  Our findings suggest that Japanese multinational firms have been responsive to low 
cost opportunities abroad and have diverted investments in fixed capital from high wage  
countries to low wage countries in the period of study.
15  The presence of active wage 
arbitrage in fixed capital investment allocation depends on the expansion opportunities and 
cost (increases) the multinational firms are facing in their existing configuration of global 
activities. This suggests that features of multinationality itself are another source of firm 
heterogeneity affecting foreign investment decisions, in addition to heterogeneity related to 
competitive advantage and technological strength represented by R&D intensity or 
productivity (Yeaple 2009, Chen and Moore 2009).  
  Our analysis suggests two routes through which multinational firms transmit local 
shocks affecting wages or liquidity across countries through their capital investment 
allocation decisions. A local wage shock in countries with an important presence of 
multinational firms, positively affects capital investment in other countries in which these 
firms are active. This transmission mechanism can exacerbate the effects of a local wage 
shock and deepen recessions through a sharper reduction in investments in countries with a 
sizeable presence of multinational firms. In addition, substitution effects between 
investments can occur through increases or decreases in the cost of capital and variation in 
the cross-border intra-firm provision of internal funds. Given financial constraints and 
increasing marginal costs of capital, a tightening of financial constraints for firms, e.g. as a 
consequence of a domestic financial shock, also reduces investments abroad.  
                                                            
15  We note that we cannot derive explicit implications on how exchange rate changes will affect 
multinational firms’ capital investment, as a currency appreciation will on the one hand raise the 
country’s relative wage rate (negatively affecting investment), but on the other hand it will raise 
purchasing power and increase demand for multinational firms’ output (positively affecting 
investment).   22
    Our finding that financing constraints are another source of interaction between 
investments is in line with earlier work (Stevens and Lipsey 1991). It is consistent with the 
notion that internal capital markets of multinational firms are important and frequently used 
by multinational firms to deal with host country capital market imperfections (Desai et al. 
2004). It suggests that multinational firms, though they have broader options to source funds 
for their global operations affiliates, may still be unable to offset financing restrictions on 
investments.  
  Our results contrast with the findings in Desai et al (2005a), which suggest a positive 
impact of foreign investment activity on domestic capital formation by US multinationals.
16 
There are several possible causes for these differences. First, we examined investment 
decisions in multiple countries and did not limit attention to investment in the home country. 
Secondly, we explicitly examined cost motivations in investment decisions with wage costs 
the driver of interactions in addition to the demand growth motivation studied by Desai et al. 
(2005a). Third, the pattern of foreign investments by Japanese firms with a concentration in 
South East Asia differs from that of US multinationals which have a greater focus on 
Western Europe (e.g. Fukao et al. 2003). Investments in Asia have been driven by cost 
considerations and labour cost has been an important driver of location decisions (e.g. 
Blomström et al. 2000, Head and Ries 2002). Potential complementarities between 
investments in different countries, e.g. through intra-firm trade between upstream and 
downstream activities (Hanson et al. 2005), may occur through the operations of other firms 
and particularly firms within the Japanese business group, rather than within the boundaries 
of the multinational firms (e.g. Belderbos and Sleuwaegen 1998, Blonigen et al. 2005). 
Further investigation could examine long term inter-firm relationships and investment 
interactions within Japanese business groups.  
                                                            
16  The results are in line with studies in the international business literature on the sensitivity of 
affiliate employment to international wage differentials (e.g. Belderbos and Zou 2008).   23
  Our results also suggest a number of other fruitful improvements and extensions in future 
research. Empirically, future models of fixed capital investments preferably take into account 
the dynamics of investment processes, which can only be uncovered through the use of panel 
data. Our finding on finance constraints driving interaction between investment decisions 
suggests that further research should model these explicitly integrating manufacturing and 
finance interactions. Replication of this type of study on data for multinationals from other 
countries would show if differences in empirical results on investment interactions are due to 
the empirical specification or the different nature of investment motives. Future modelling 
work on global investment decisions would pay attention to more complex intra-firm 
relationships between manufacturing affiliates (Grossman et al. 2006), and could combine 
decisions on establishing affiliates in additional countries (extensive margin) with capital 
investment decisions for existing affiliates.  Finally, our analysis assumed that multinational 
firms operating in a given country and industry face the same given wage level. Recent 
evidence by Budd et al. (2005) suggests that wage bargaining processes in multinational 
firms are such that wages at the affiliate level are also a function of profitability of the parent. 
Perhaps the effects of wage differentials between countries may be mitigated over time if 
local unions can bargain for global rent sharing. Future work can examine the joint 
determination of investment and wages at the affiliate level and investigate to what extent 
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Appendix 1: Derivations 
 
1.1. Derivation of gross profit function 
In the short run, the firm’s capital stock Kc is given and the firm determines optimal labour 
input in country j, Lj to maximize its current profit. Let  c w  be the wage cost per unit of 






, the variable and marginal cost functions for production of each product in 
country c are given by: 
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If we use equation (9), (A1) to substitute for  c VC , (8) to substitute for  c Q , and (7) to 
substitute for  ' ,c c D  in order to derive the first order condition with respect to the price  ' ,c c p , 
then the optimal pricing behaviour of the firm is: 
 
(A3)   c
c c







We note that  ' ,c c p is determined for a given allocation of Z across countries. Hence, zc for 
c=1, .. , C is given at this stage of the firm’s decision making process. Using equation (7) in 
(8) and applying (A3) and (A2), we have the following condition for optimal output in 
country c,   30
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 . From equation (A1), (A2), and (A5), we also have: 
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Using equation (9), (A3), (8) and (A4) respectively we can derive the gross profit function: 
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Since the firm chooses its output prices for a given allocation of products across countries, 
gross profit depends on zc for c = 1, 2, .. , C. Gross profit in country c increases with higher 
total factor productivity ( c  ), with higher market potential ( c  ), with lower wages wc and a 
higher initial stock of capital in country c.   
 
1.2. Derivation of optimal allocation products across countries 
We derive the optimal allocation of Z across countries. To this end the firm maximizes (9) 
with respect to zc for c = 1, 2, .. , C subject to the constraint in equation (5). Optimization of 
this problem making use of the Lagrangian implies that the firm should equalize the marginal 
gain across all countries: 
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Next, using equation (5) we can derive the optimal value of zc: 
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1.3. Derivation of marginal profit of capital 
To derive the marginal profit of capital we use equation (9), (A8) and (A11) to substitute for zc 
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Appendix 2: Correlation matrix 
 
(obs=1707) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
(1) INVRATIO 1
(2) RDINTf 0,0971 1
(3) COVERAGEf -0,0249 -0,1668 1
(4) WAGEi -0,0916 0,0259 0,0091 1
(5) WAGEj 0,1605 0,1408 -0,0138 -0,3817 1
(6) PRODVi 0,0293 0,1412 -0,031 0,312 -0,0184 1
(7) PRODVj 0,0569 0,1993 -0,0228 0,0002 0,1878 0,3015 1
(8) DEMANDi -0,0648 -0,0081 0,0216 0,4533 -0,2546 -0,2195 -0,1085 1
(9) DEMANDj 0,0325 0,0562 -0,0095 -0,228 0,4485 -0,0884 -0,262 0,0854 1
(10) Δ WAGEi -0,0519 -0,0268 0,0343 0,2301 -0,1186 -0,0292 -0,0293 0,0372 -0,097 1
(11) Δ WAGEj 0,0573 0,0288 0,0239 -0,1858 0,314 -0,0273 0,0033 -0,1377 0,098 -0,0606 1
(12) Δ PRODVi 0,0317 -0,0444 -0,0173 -0,3133 0,1418 -0,3461 -0,0407 -0,0598 0,1004 -0,0298 0,0971 1
(13) Δ PRODVj -0,0969 -0,1891 -0,0214 0,1209 -0,3307 -0,093 -0,5714 0,1194 -0,0103 0,0881 -0,1162 -0,0891 1
(14) Δ DEMANDi 0,1229 0,2076 0,0284 -0,0628 0,135 -0,1131 0,1007 0,1252 0,0675 -0,048 0,0247 -0,0846 -0,2017 1
(15) Δ DEMANDj 0,0553 0,2035 0,0428 0,0396 -0,0059 0,1094 0,0513 0,0429 0,0834 -0,0584 -0,0446 -0,1335 -0,2125 0,4359 
 
 Table 1. Descriptive statistics by industry 
 
Note: Amounts in million yen 
 
Industry Number of Average  capital  Average 
observations stock  investment 
ratio
Food, Beverages and Tobacco  61 17.618 0,120
Textiles,Clothing,Leather and Footwear  105 8.460 0,152
Wood & Furniture 16 19.730 0,173
Paper, Printing and Publishing 31 36.140 0,191
Chemicals  161 20.437 0,290
Drugs & Medicines 33 17.233 0,225
Petroleum and Coal Products and Refinery  6 180.728 0,186
Rubber and Plastic  88 8.581 0,234
Non Metallic Mineral Products  56 28.342 0,279
Iron & Steel  34 116.124 0,273
Non-Ferrous Metals  55 16.999 0,371
Metal Products  48 16.336 0,222
Non-Electrical Machinery 145 10.194 0,300
Office, Computing and Accounting Machinery 36 8.292 0,401
Electrical Machinery  259 7.881 0,292
Radio, TV and Communication Equipment 191 13.591 0,334
Motor Vehicles 274 15.038 0,304
Other Transport Equipment 8 25.721  0,672
Professional Goods/Medical & optical & precision eq 48 5.523 0,344
Other Manufacturing 52 4.341 0,238
Total  1707 16.159 0,280  35
Table 2. Descriptive statistics by country 
 
Notes: Amounts in million yen. 
    (D)  Suppressed to avoid disclosure of data of individual companies. 
 
 
Country Number of  Average Average 
 observations  capital stock investment 
ratio
Japan 502 50.051 0,160
United States 248 3.174 0,355
United Kingdom  62 1.651 0,376
Belgium  5  1.035 0,081
France  20 969 0,298
Germany 40 1.666 0,304
Italy 6  1.935 0,379
Netherlands 14 4.770 0,264
Sweden  2  (D) 0,555
Canada  15 8.414 0,243
Ireland 3  922 0,502
Portugal 3  632 1,127
Spain 13 2.069 0,297
Australia  11 733 0,388
New Zealand 4  2.192 0,305
Brazil  21 1.583 0,153
Colombia  2  (D) 0,230
Mexico  18 994 0,384
Hong Kong 49 541 0,333
India 11 4.575 0,419
Indonesia 65 2.042 0,361
Korea  77 1.044 0,374
Malaysia 73 2.828 0,284
Philippines  25 779 0,317
Singapore 89 1.435 0,417
Thailand 104 2.518 0,309
Taiwan  111 1.131 0,217
China 112 1.168 0,334
Hungary 2  (D) 0,302
Total 1707 16.159 0,280  36 
Table 3. Description of variables 
 
variable   
Symbol Description  Mean Std.  Dev. 
INVRATIO  ct ct K I /   Gross investment ratio in 1996  0,28046  0,409218 
PRODV  1 ,   t c   Industry patent intensity in country i in 1995  0,010784 0,018964 
PRODVj  1 ,   t c   Industry patent intensity in all other countries  (j≠i) in 1995  0,011833 0,017557 
DEMANDi  1 ,   t c   Industry demand in country i in 1995  20,35743 0,843602 
DEMANDj  1 ,   t c   Weighted average industry demand in all other countries  (j≠i) in 1995  20,62594 0,727617 
WAGEi  1 ,  t c w   Industry wage rate in country i in 1995  0,486443 1,232282 
WAGEj  1 ,  t c w   Industry wage rate in all other countries (j≠i) in 1995  1,051268 0,897609 
Δ PRODVi  Δ  1 ,   t c   Growth rate of industry patent intensity in country i from 1994 to 1995  ‐0,00093  0,002709 
Δ PRODVj  Δ  1 ,   t c   Growth rate of industry patent intensity in all other countries from 1994 to 1995  ‐0,00149  0,0022 
Δ DEMANDi  Δ  1 ,   t c   Growth rate of industry demand in country i from 1994 to 1995  0,143347 0,071238 
Δ DEMANDj  Δ  1 ,   t c  
Growth rate of weighted average industry demand in all other countries from 1994 to 
1995  0,138786 0,058231 
Δ WAGEi  Δ  1 ,  t c w   Growth rate of industry wage in country i from 1994 to 1995  ‐0,00795  0,375647 






t c t K Z
1
1 , 1 /   R&D to global asset ratio in 1995  0,101167 0,110152 
COVERAGEf   -   Global coverage ratio in 1995  ‐3,31739  0,969094 
Notes: All variables in natural logarithms (investment ratio, patent intensity, and R&D intensity after adding 1).  
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AFFILIATE ASSETS -0.265*** -0.265***
(0.017) (0.017)
No. of observations 1707 1707
Industry dummies Yes Yes
chi-squared 513.6 515.6




Notes: standard errors in parentheses; *significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, 
***significant at 1% level (two-tailed test); clustering of standard errors at the parent firm 
level. Industry dummies (not reported) are jointly significant. 